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On Time in Cinema 
 
1. Cinema as an art of time passing  
In a seminal paper on the definition of cinema, Noël Carroll (1996) pointed out five basic features 
an entity x must satisfy in order to qualify as a moving image: 
 
1. “x is a detached display” (1996: 70). More specifically, the moving image is a “display” 
since it is constituted by a visual array; and it is “detached” since it induces the spectator to 
visually experience a space which, unlike her ordinary space, is not centered in and 
connected to her body (namely, it is not an “egocentric space”).  
2. “x belongs to the class of things from which the impression of movement is technically 
possible” (1996: 70). That is, the cinematic display is produced in such a way that it can 
induce the spectator to visually experience things moving.  
3. “Performance tokens of x are generated by a template that is a token” (1996: 70). Here, 
Carroll treats the moving image as a type and calls “templates” the particular objects (e.g., 
film prints, videotapes, DVDs, computer files) that instantiate the type by storing it, while 
he calls “performance tokens” the particular events (namely, screenings) that instantiate the 
type by showing it.  
4. “Performance tokens of x are not artworks in their own right” (1996: 70). That is, the 
screening of a movie, unlike the execution of a symphony or the staging of a play, cannot be 
artistically assessed in its own right.  
5. “x is [...] two-dimensional” (1996: 70). That is, the visual array constituting the cinematic 
display is a flat surface.  
 
Interestingly, Carroll never mentions time in his five conditions. Conditions (1) and (5) 
concern spatial features, while conditions (3) and (4) concern the process through which a film is 
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instantiated, and condition (2) concerns movement. Nevertheless, in condition (2) time seems to 
play a crucial role, albeit unnoticed – a more fundamental role than movement.  
In fact, Carroll does not require that the moving image elicits the impression of movement 
from the spectator, but only that it has the possibility of eliciting such an impression. He does so 
because he wants to take into account “static films” such as La Jetée (C. Marker, 1962), One 
Second in Montreal (M. Snow 1969), and Poetic Justice (H. Frampton, 1972), which are made, 
partly or wholly, by still images (for a thorough account of static films, see Remes 2015). Although 
in such works there is no movement, in principle there might have been movement, and for Carroll 
this is enough to count them as cinematic works; the possibility of eliciting the impression of 
movement distinguishes such works from full-fledged static images like paintings or photographs.  
Still, one might wonder why static films have the possibility of eliciting the impression of 
movement whereas paintings and photographs lack this possibility. The most basic reason seems to 
be that static films, unlike paintings and photographs, have a duration. Although static films do not 
in fact elicit the impression of movement, their duration in principle gives them the possibility, 
albeit in fact unexploited, of eliciting the impression of movement (cf. Ponech 2010, Terrone 2014, 
and Remes 2015). Conversely, static pictures such as paintings and photographs cannot elicit the 
impression of movement even in principle.  
The point is that any film, as such, has a fixed duration, namely its runtime, which is a 
normative feature of the film as a type. That is to say that every correct screening of a film that has 
a duration Df* ought to last Df*. Because of that, the duration of the spectator’s experience is in turn 
normatively set by Df*: a proper experience of a film the duration of which is Df* ought to last Df*. 
As Craig Bourne and Emily Caddick Bourne point out, “there is an important sense in which a film 
has duration and static images lack duration. You can sensibly say ‘The film lasted ninety minutes’, 
but not ‘The painting lasted ninety minutes’. The moving nature of the film determines a particular 
viewing time in a way static images do not.” (2016: 136)  
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Such a feature distinguishes cinema not only from static images but also from literature and 
theater. Indeed, neither literary works nor theatrical works have a fixed duration. Theatrical works 
have a fixed duration, which sets the duration of the spectator’s experience, only at the performance 
level, not at the work level; a certain performance of Hamlet may last four hours, but Hamlet as a 
work does not have a fixed duration. And literary works lack duration even at the performance 
level, since any reader can take all the time she wants to read a certain book (even a book made of 
pictures, such as a comic book). The only form of art that functions like cinema with respect to 
duration is recorded music; from an ontological point of view, indeed, one might conceive of a 
piece of recorded music as a film pared down to its soundtrack (cf. Kania 2006).  
If this is right, Carroll’s condition (2), i.e. the possibility of eliciting the impression of 
movement, is rooted in a more basic feature of the moving image, namely the possession of a 
duration. A film can lack movement, as in the case of static films, but it cannot lack a duration. As 
Justin Remes puts is, “Whether one is considering Gérard Courant’s 187-hour Cinématon (1978–
2014) or Thomas Edison’s five-second Fred Ott’s Sneeze (1894), all films have a running time […] 
the more fundamental distinction between cinema and photography (as well as other traditional 
visual arts) is not movement but duration.” (2015: 12)  
Notoriously, cinema is the abbreviation of ‘cinematography’, a term coming from the two 
Greek terms ‘kinema’, which means movements, and ‘graphein’, which means writing. Yet, if we 
agree to treat static films as works of cinema, then a more appropriate name for this medium would 
be ‘chronography’, that is, the writing of time. In the domain of continental philosophy, such a 
priority of time over movement in cinema has been emphasized by Gilles Deleuze (1983 and 1985). 
Deleuze splits up films into two kinds, namely, the “movement-image” and the “time-image”. Films 
of the former kind focus on the movements and changes of the characters that liven up the narrative, 
whereas films of the latter kind focus on the passage of time as such and treat the movements and 
changes of the characters as nothing but accidental ways in which the passage of time can show up. 
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Deleuze suggests that the latter films get closer than the former to what is fundamental in cinema, 
inasmuch as they show that cinema is more than merely an art of depicting movement.  
 
2. Film as depiction of time  
In order to investigate how cinema “writes” time, I shall focus on the notions of representation and 
depiction. Firstly, by representation I mean an entity that elicits thoughts or experiences about some 
other entities from a suitable recipient. That is to say, a representation is an entity that prescribes 
thoughts or experiences concerning other entities. The content of a representation is what this 
representation mandates us to think or experience. As Recanati puts it, “Representations have two 
aspects: they are objects like tables and chairs, and as such they belong to the real world; but they 
also have a content by virtue of which they represent the world as being a certain way, possibly 
distinct from the way it actually is.” (1996: §6) To sum up, I conceive of a representation as a 
normative notion inasmuch as it requires a correct attitude, namely the attitude of a suitable 
recipient who entertains the thoughts or enjoys the experiences prescribed by the representation 
itself.  
Secondly, by depiction I mean a representation that shares some relevant features with the 
entity it represents thereby prescribing and supporting a perceptual experience that shares some 
relevant features with a possible experience of the entity represented. Moreover, the sharing of 
features between the representation and the entity represented cannot be accidental; the 
representation must represent an entity as possessing certain features in virtue of the 
representation’s possessing some identical or, at least, relevantly similar features (cf. Currie 1995: 
91; Yaffe 2003: 118; Le Poidevin 2007: 133). For instance, a painting can represent the sky as 
being blue in virtue of being itself blue whereas the inscription “black” does not represent the color 
black in virtue of being black; it does so in virtue of a convention. That is why the inscription is just 
a representation whereas the painting is a depiction.  
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In cinematic depiction, the relevant features shared by the representation and what is 
represented are not only spatial but also temporal. In Catharine Abell’s terms, “cinematic 
representation is a distinctive form of depiction, unique in its capacity to depict temporal 
properties” (2010: 278). In Gregory Currie’s terms, “What is distinctively temporal about film is not 
its portrayal of time, but the manner of its portrayal: its portrayal of time by means of time.” (1995: 
96) For instance, a film can depict an event that lasts three minutes by means of its own duration of 
three minutes. In this case, the property of the event of “lasting three minutes” is depicted by the 
property of the representation of the event of “lasting three minutes”, namely by the same property. 
Thus, experience prescribed by a cinematic depiction lasts exactly the same time as a possible direct 
experience of the event represented.  
Still, the fact that cinema can represent a three minute event by means of a three minute 
representation does not entail that any film necessarily does so. Indeed, in cinema we often find 
representations that last less time than the events represented; for instance, American Graffiti (G. 
Lucas, 1973) represents an event lasting one night (namely, the adventures of a group of teenagers) 
in less than two hours, and so do Into the Night (J. Landis, 1985) and After Hours (M. Scorsese, 
1985). Though less frequently, we can also find cinematic representations that last longer than the 
events represented, namely “expansions” (cf. Bordwell 1985: 83–88). For instance, a film can 
implement an expansion by resorting to slow-motion, or by showing multiple points of view on the 
same event – for example, the three points of view on the money exchange in Jackie Brown (Q. 
Tarantino, 1997).  
In order to take such possibilities into account, we should distinguish three kinds of cinematic 
duration, namely, the duration Df of the film itself; the duration Ds of the spectator’s experience; the 
duration De of the events portrayed (cf. Levinson & Alperson 1991: 446; and Currie 1995: 92). By 
“event portrayed” I mean an event that the film represents by prescribing a continuous experience 
that enables the suitable spectator to perceive either the event in its entirety or at least the highlights 
of it. In the former case the cinematic depiction is more complete than in the latter, just as a portrait 
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of a person that shows her body in its entirety is more complete than one that shows only her face. 
Yet, many cinematic representations are of the latter kind. For instance, American Graffiti portrays 
an event lasting one night by prescribing a continuous experience lasting about a hundred minutes, 
and this experience enables the suitable spectator to perceive the highlights of this event.  
David Bordwell and Kristin Thompson (2001) call the duration of the events portrayed the 
“plot duration”, and distinguish it from the “story duration”, which encompasses the events 
portrayed as well as other events related to them. In Bordwell and Thompson’s example, “The plot 
of North by Northwest [A. Hitchcock, 1959] presents four crowded days and nights in the life of 
Roger Thornhill. But the story stretches back far before that, since information about the past is 
revealed in the course of the plot.” (2001: 75, my emphasis) In fact, films can also represent events 
without depicting them at all. For instance, when a film shows a character telling a past episode – 
say, when Alexandre in La Maman et la Putain (J. Eustache, 1973) tells the episode of the people 
crying in a café – the episode is represented but not depicted; what is depicted is just the event of 
telling, namely Alexandre’s speech act.  
To sum up, among the distinct kinds of duration that are relevant for cinema, the duration Df 
of the film is the ontologically fundamental one, that is, that grounding the possibility of the 
impression of movement, which Carroll treats as an essential feature of the moving image (see §1).  
Df normatively sets not only the duration of any correct screening of the work but also the 
duration Ds of any correct experience of the work. Yet, such a normative requirement does not hold 
for the duration De of the events represented. A film lasting Df* can portray an event lasting Df*, 
but it might also portray an event lasting more than Df* or even less than Df*.  
If a film that lasts Df* actually depicts an event that lasts Df*, then, following Alaina Schempp 
(2012), I shall call it a ‘real-time film’. Examples of real-time films are Rope (A. Hitchcock, 1948) 
and Timecode (M. Figgis, 2000), as well as 12 Angry Men (S. Lumet, 1957) and Buried (R. Cortés, 
2010) – and arguably even the experimental film lasting twenty-four hours The Clock (C. Marclay, 
2010). Rope notoriously achieves the real-time effect by means of a unique long take (with ten 
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hidden cuts) while Timecode is a four panel split screen display that was filmed with four cameras 
running simultaneously. In general, the property of being constituted by a unique long take is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for a film to be a real-time film. It is not necessary since a film 
lasting Df* can depict an event lasting Df* even if it exploits editing, as in Twelve Angry Men or in 
Buried  – let alone The Clock. And is not sufficient since a film lasting Df* can portray an event that 
lasts more than Df* even if it is constituted by a unique long take. For instance, Birdman or (The 
Unexpected Virtue of Ignorance) (A. González Inarritu, 2014) portrays several days in the life of 
the hero by means of a long take lasting about two hours; Imagine (Z. Rybczyński, 1987) portrays 
an entire life by means of a long take lasting three minutes and fifteen seconds; and Russian Ark (A. 
Sokurov, 2002) portrays centuries of the history of Russia by means of a unique long take lasting 
about ninety minutes. 
In fact, most movies are not real-time films. A film usually portrays a story that lasts longer – 
sometimes much longer – than the film itself. Yet, if we focus on a single shot of a movie, we find 
that the real-time principle normally holds. A shot seems to infringe the real-time principle only in 
special cases such as fast-motion or slow-motion (for subtler violations, see Bordwell 1985: 81–82; 
and Smith 1995: 42–44). I will discuss such cases in §4. Alleged exceptions like these apart, the 
real-time principle seems to be standard for single shots. Bourne and Caddick Bourne characterize 
what I have called the “real-time principle” as a “norm of duration” according to which “the 
fictional duration of an episode and the amount of viewing time over which it is represented are 
identical” (2016: 137). Likewise, Currie observes that “in the filmic case, at least within the 
confines of a single shot (and frequently across the class of shots that constitute a scene), there is no 
violation of the time of the film – neither with respect to order nor with respect to duration” (1995: 
220).  
As suggested by Currie, most movies are inclined to abide by the real-time principle not only 
for single shots, but also for bigger temporal units that depict unitary events that are relevant for the 
progression of the story. Following Christian Metz (1966), I shall call the latter units “scenes”. A 
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scene is a real-time portion of a film even if it can be – and in fact often is – constituted by the 
editing of several shots; the temporal continuity in such cases is often warranted by sound. The 
special case in which a scene is constituted by a unique shot, without any cut, is called “sequence 
shot” (cf. Metz 1966: 122).  
Ultimately, with respect to duration, the spectator’s experience exhibits analogies but also 
differences in comparison with ordinary perception. Both at the shot level and at the scene level, the 
spectator’s experience normally has the same duration as the event it is about, just as ordinary 
perception does. Conversely, at the level of the whole film, the spectator’s experience normally 
lasts much less time than the event it is about, and in this sense it significantly differs from ordinary 
experience. In watching American Graffiti, we experience an event lasting one night by means of a 
continuous perceptual experience lasting two hours, whereas in ordinary perception we could never 
do so. That is why real-time films are correctly said to be more realistic than the other films with 
respect to duration; the former, unlike the latter, provide us with the same temporal relation between 
experience and experienced events that we enjoy in ordinary perception.  
 
3. Film experience as a temporal experience  
Let us initially focus on the case of real-time films, which is the one that exhibits the strongest 
analogy with ordinary perception. Is the experience of a real-time film a temporal experience of the 
same kind as ordinary perception? In order to address this question, it is worth noting that, even in 
the case of a real-time film, film experience remains a pictorial experience, that is, an experience of 
entities depicted.  
Richard Wollheim (1998) characterizes the pictorial experience as a peculiar perceptual state, 
namely “seeing-in,” constituted by two folds; in the “configurational fold” we experience the marks 
on the picture’s surface as content-fixing features, while in the “recognitional fold” we experience 
the depicted scene as the picture’s content. In cinema, the configurational fold is harder to 
characterize than, say, in painting, since the film’s spectator does not normally pay attention to the 
10 
 
light spots projected on the screen. Nevertheless, the film’s spectator is aware at least of the shape 
and the size of the screen, and this seems enough to have a configurational fold also in the case of 
cinema. As Robert Hopkins puts it, “Perhaps cinema images differ in that we find it hard to see the 
content-fixing features. We are frequently aware of them only by seeing in them the content they 
fix, and see what is before us as a picture only by seeing other features, such as the shape and size 
of the screen” (2009: 69). Interestingly, Francis Sparshott foreshadows cinematic twofoldness when 
he writes: “most of the time one is simultaneously aware of a film (as one is of a painting) both as a 
two-dimensional arrangement on the screen and as a three-dimensional scene, so that neither aspect 
dominates the mind except in moments of excitement or disaffection” (1971: 18). And so does 
Alexander Sesonske: “We experience a film as a two-dimensional design on a flat surface and a 
three-dimensional space within which the action of the film occurs. Cinema shares this duality of its 
space with painting” (1974: 54).  
Such a twofoldness – or, as Sesonske calls it, “duality” – is related to the basic feature of the 
moving image that Carroll calls “detached display” (see §1). On the one hand, the spectator 
experiences the screen as having its place in her egocentric space (i.e. the space centered in and 
connected to her body); the screen is at a certain distance from the spectator who can orient herself 
with respect to it and even move towards it. On the other hand, the spectator does not experience the 
entities depicted as having their place in her egocentric space (cf. Matthen 2005). Thus, the space 
depicted “is discontinuous with the space of our normal world” (Sesonske 1974: 55); “we observe 
from a viewpoint at which we are not situated” (Sparshott 1971: 19). This is what Carroll calls 
“detached display”.i 
That being the case, one might wonder whether what holds for space also holds for time. 
Given that the spectator does not experience the events depicted as happening here, in front of her, 
in her environment, can we conclude that she also does not experience those events as happening 
now, in her own present? The inference seems to be hasty. Indeed, there is at least one case in 
which the spectator experiences the events depicted in the moving image as happening now. This is 
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the case of live television, in which the spatial detachment of the pictorial experience does not 
prevent the spectator from experiencing the events depicted in the moving image as temporally 
present. In short, the spectator of live television does not experience the events depicted as 
happening here, but nevertheless she experiences those very events as happening now.ii  
Is live television a paradigmatic case for all the other kinds of cinematic experience, including 
the experience of fiction movies? Currie calls the positive answer to this question “The Claim of 
Presentness” (1995: 200). I am focusing here on the Claim of Presentness understood as the 
phenomenological claim that the spectator experiences the events depicted in a film as being 
present, as going on right now. As pointed out by Gideon Yaffe (2003), Robin Le Poidevin (2007) 
and Bourne and Caddick Bourne (2016), we may also interpret the Claim of Presentness as the 
metaphysical claim that a film ascribes the property of being present to the events depicted, so that 
the fictional events represented in a film constitute what McTaggart (1908) calls an “A-series”.  
From Currie’s perspective, the Claim of Presentness is wrong both as a phenomenological 
claim and as a metaphysical claim. The point is that cinema cannot depict tensed properties (or “A-
series” features) of pastness, presentness and futurity; it only depicts tenseless relations (or “B-
series” features) of precedence or simultaneity (cf. Currie 1995: 218). Therefore, cinema can neither 
elicit a sense of presentness from the spectator (phenomenological claim) nor ascribe the property 
of presentness to the events depicted (metaphysical claim). The metaphysical interpretation of the 
Claim of Presentness lies beyond the scope of this paper, which concerns temporal experience. In 
what follows I focus on the Claim of Presentness as a phenomenological claim.  
Accounts of film experience like those proposed by George Wilson (1997, 2011) or Hopkins 
(2008, 2010) make room for the Claim of Presentness, inasmuch as they treat the experience of a 
fiction movie as having the same phenomenology as the experience of moving pictures of real 
events – for instance, live television pictures. Yet, according to Currie, the Claim of Presentness is 
flawed since it cannot take such “anachronies” as flashbacks into account (1995: 201).  
12 
 
A film exhibits an anachrony when the temporal order of the depiction of the events does not 
comply with the temporal order of the events depicted. In the paradigmatic case of a flashback, a 
film depicts an event X1 after another event X2 even though, in the objective order of the events in 
the fictional world, X1 occurs before X2. Currie argues that if the spectator’s ordinary 
phenomenology involves a sense of presentness, then the experience of a flashback should exhibit a 
distinctive phenomenology, which either suspends the sense of presentness or preserves it by 
supplementing it with a sense of time traveling. According to Currie, no phenomenological changes 
of these sorts show up in the experience of flashbacks. Although the spectator knows that the event 
X1 that she is seeing in a flashback objectively precedes the event X2 that she saw before, at the 
experiential level she perceives X1 in the same way as she perceived X2 (instead of perceiving X1 as 
past, or as the experiential result of a time travel of her own). For these reason, Currie finally rejects 
the Claim of Presentness. 
In the first instance, one might defend the Claim of Presentness against Currie’s argument by 
observing that when an exciting scene of a movie is suddenly interrupted by a flashback, the 
phenomenology slightly changes. The flashback seems to modify the spectators’ phenomenology 
just as a commercial break would modify the phenomenology of the experience of a live broadcast 
of a football match.  
More generally, the Claim of Presentness can be defended by arguing that film experience, as 
a perceptual experience, should conform to a principle that Le Poidevin (2015: §1) expresses in the 
following terms, “what we perceive, we perceive as present―as going on right now.” If one 
combines Le Poidevin’s principle, which states that the perceptual experience is an experience of 
events as happening now, with the premise that film experience is a perceptual experience of 
depicted events, one can conclude that film experience is an experience of depicted events as 
happening now. As Yaffe puts it, “if ordinary visual experiences represent A-series properties, why 
should films be any different?” (2003: 125) 
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Still, this conclusion is debatable if we go back to the consideration that film experience, as a 
pictorial experience, is a peculiar perceptual experience. It might be that the peculiarity of film 
experience as a pictorial experience also involves the possibility of an infraction of Le Poidevin’s 
principle. Since pictorial experience has two folds – one might argue – Le Poidevin’s principle only 
holds for the configurational fold, not for the recognitional fold. The spectator experiences the 
projection of light on the screen as going on right now, but not the events depicted as going on right 
now.  
However, the perceptual experience of the spectators normally focuses on the events depicted, 
not on the light projected. If the perceptual experience that is more relevant for the spectator is that 
in the recognitional fold, why should Le Poidevin’s principle not apply to this experience? We can 
try to address this issue by relating the peculiar temporality of film experience to its peculiar 
spatiality. Film experience, as pictorial experience, involves two spaces, namely the egocentric 
space in the configurational fold and the pictorial space in the recognitional fold; the spectator 
experiences the screen as being located in her egocentric space and the depicted events as taking 
place in the pictorial space. In Sesonske’s terms, we can draw a distinction between “screen space, 
the two-dimensional rectangle on the surface of the screen” and “action-space, the three 
dimensional space within which characters live and die, horses run, lovers sigh, and we can 
encounter almost any imaginable kind of event” (1980: 420).  
That being the case, one might wonder whether film experience involves not only two spaces, 
but also two temporal dimensions. Henry Wallon (1953) answers this question affirmatively. He 
argues that film experience involves two temporal series. The first one, which I shall call the 
“egocentric series”, is based on the spectator’s proprioception of her own body, which is at the 
center of her egocentric space, but may also involve a visual component (for instance, noticing a 
moviegoer who checks her smartphone) and an auditory component (for instance, hearing a 
moviegoer who munches popcorn). The second one, which I shall call the “pictorial series”, is 
based on the visual and auditory experience of the events that occur in the pictorial space. In short, 
14 
 
the egocentric series is an experiential route through egocentric space whereas the pictorial series is 
an experiential route through pictorial space.  
In the experience of live television, the suitable spectator treats the events experienced as 
present in the pictorial series as simultaneous with what is felt as present in the egocentric series. In 
contrast, in the experience of a recording of a real event, the suitable spectator treats the events 
experienced as present in the pictorial series as prior to what is felt as present in the egocentric 
series. Finally, in the experience of a fiction movie, the suitable spectator treats the events 
experienced as present in the pictorial series as completely disconnected from what is felt as present 
in the egocentric series; the two temporal series run parallel and never converge. Although in all 
three cases (live TV, recording, fiction) the events in the pictorial series are experienced as present 
at the perceptual level according to Le Poidevin’s principle, nevertheless they are treated differently 
at the cognitive level. Therefore, the experiences in the pictorial series, depending on their different 
relationships to the egocentric series, have different inferential roles and lead to the creation of 
different beliefs.  
 
4. The spectator as a time explorer  
In an insightful book on time in literature, Marcel Vuillaume (1990) argues that the recipient of a 
work of fiction can play the role of an unnoticed observer who enjoys special perceptual capacities 
not available in ordinary perception – first of all the capacity to observe events without any spatial 
connection to them. If one combines this hypothesis by Vuillaume with Wallon’s hypothesis that 
film experience consists of two temporal series (see §3), one might conclude that the film spectator 
can enjoy the privilege described by Vuillaume, i.e. observing events without any spatial connection 
to them, in the pictorial series described by Wallon. I shall call this “the Wallon-Vuillaume 
hypothesis”.  
This hypothesis provides us with a way of facing another objection that Currie raises against 
the Claim of Presentness, namely that the spectator cannot experience the fictional events as 
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happening now since she has no place in the fictional world. According to the Wallon-Vuillaume 
hypothesis, the pictorial series provides the unnoticed observer, whose role can be played by the 
spectator, with the capacity to observe events in the fictional world without having a place in that 
world (for similar arguments against Currie’s point, see also Wilson 1997 and 2011; and Walton 
1997).  
If all of this is right, cinema is capable of supplementing our ordinary temporal experience 
with a peculiar temporal experience, which unfolds in the pictorial series. In ordinary temporal 
experience, experiencing an event as happening now involves a strong inclination to believe (unless 
one has independent reasons for not doing so) that this event is actually happening now. This can 
occasionally lead us to undergo some temporal illusions, as when we instinctively treat a distant star 
displaying long past states as present. Conversely, in the peculiar temporal experience that fiction 
films provide us with, experiencing an event as happening now in the pictorial series does not 
involve a strong inclination to believe that this event is really happening now inasmuch as such a 
putative inclination to believe also requires a correspondence between the pictorial series and the 
egocentric series (as in the case of live television). Thus, in experience of fiction films, the sense of 
presentness comes down to our way of experiencing the portion of fictional time that we are 
currently exploring.  
Furthermore, the pictorial series makes room for additional experiential privileges that 
specifically concern the temporal dimension, viz. jumps (flashback, ellipsis, flashforward) and 
phenomena of acceleration (fast-motion) and deceleration (slow-motion, freeze-frame). Currie 
characterizes such cases as “a violation of a cinematic norm”, namely “the violation of real time” 
(1995: 119–220). According to the Wallon-Vuillaume hypothesis, the violation is carried out by the 
pictorial series, which violates the constraints of standard temporal experience which the egocentric 
series abides by. In particular, as suggested by Currie, in such cases the pictorial series violates the 
real-time principle, which is a core feature of ordinary perception. Yaffe nicely expresses this point 
when he writes: “films [...] freely transform the location of the present, and thus give to viewers the 
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sense that the spotlight of the present—the spotlight that, in life, moves so doggedly to the right 
across the timeline—can be shined on any time” (2003: 138).  
The first kind of temporal experiential privilege I shall consider is that of jumps. In the 
pictorial series, indeed, the spectator can jump from experiencing an event X to experiencing 
another event that is not temporally contiguous to X. If the spectator jumps to an event W that is 
successive but not contiguous to X, we have an ellipsis. If the spectator jumps to an event U that is 
prior to X we have a flashback. As suggested by Yaffe (2003: 136) the flashforward can be 
conceived of as a strong ellipsis, which produces a narrative gap that is then filled – or, at least, it 
should be – by a flashback (or a series thereof). In this sense, the flashforward “lets us glimpse the 
outcome before we have grasped all the causal chains that lead up to it” (Bordwell 1985: 79). In 
other words, the spectator jumps from an event X to an event W successive to and apparently 
disconnected from X (here is the strong ellipsis), and then she jumps back from W either to X itself 
or to an event Y located between X and W (here is the flashback).  
In sum, the pictorial series allows the spectator to jump both towards the future and towards 
the past. In the pictorial series, time can be explored by moving back and forth, as we normally 
explore space, and nevertheless the Claim of Presentness remains in force. Indeed, if we 
acknowledge the distinction between egocentric series and pictorial series, we can interpret Currie’s 
criticism of the Claim of Presentness as stating that the suitable spectator of a fiction movie, unlike 
the suitable spectator of live television, does not treat the pictorial series as coinciding with the 
egocentric series. So far, we can agree with Currie. Nevertheless, the Claim of Presentness still 
holds in the pictorial series: the spectator can jump from an event to another, as in the case of a 
flashback, but once she has jumped to a certain event, she starts experiencing this event as present, 
in accordance with Le Poidevin’s principle. To borrow Yaffe’s expression, “The cut resets the 
location of the present within the fiction.” (2003: 134–135)Cases of acceleration and deceleration 
also can be treated as a peculiarity of perceptual experience in the pictorial series. In such cases, the 
spectator experiences an event in its entirety through an experience lasting less (fast-motion) or 
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more (slow-motion) time than the event’s actual duration. It is worth noting that what accelerates or 
decelerates here is not the event itself, but the spectator’s perceptual experience of it. A slow-
motion shot does not normally ascribe the property of slowness to the things depicted just as a 
wide-lens shot does not normally ascribe the property of being warped (and a black and white shot 
does not normally ascribe the property of being black and white) to them. In other words, the 
pictorial series allows the spectator to enjoy a peculiar perceptual experience that, instead of sharing 
the duration of the event perceived, speeds through it (fast-motion) or lingers on it (slow-motion) or 
even stops at a certain moment of it (freeze-frame).iii  
Such an account of slow/fast-motion and freeze-frame works well when their primary function 
consists in modifying the phenomenology of the spectator’s temporal experience. It seems to me 
that the uses of the fast-motion in grotesque films such as The Ballad of Cable Hogue (S. Peckinpah 
1970) or A Clockwork Orange (S. Kubrick 1972) are of this kind, as well as the slow-motion in 
dramatic films such as Zabriskie Point (M. Antonioni, 1970), The Killer (J. Woo, 1989), 2046 
(Wong Kar-wai, 2004), Closer (M. Nichols, 2004); the freeze-frame in such films as Les 400 Coups 
(F. Truffaut, 1959) or Goodfellas (M. Scorsese, 1990) also seems to be of this kind (for a thorough 
account of slow-motion in cinema, see Rogers 2013).  
However, cinema makes room for at least two other uses (or interpretations) of these 
techniques. Firstly, they can be used to represent peculiar ontological singularities of the fictional 
world, namely, temporal acceleration or deceleration: consider for instance the fast-motion in Click 
(F. Coraci, 2006) or the slow-motion and the freeze-frame in The Matrix (A. and L. Wachowski, 
1999). Secondly, these techniques can be used to represent psychological states of characters, that 
is, as Bourne and Caddick Bourne put it, to “convey fictional truths about time as it is experienced 
by characters in the fictional situation” (2016: 148). For instance, “A slow-motion representation of 
a car accident may communicate fictional truths about how the fictional driver experiences his 
world, fictional truths which we know in the form: That is what it was like for him” (Bourne and 
Caddick Bourne 2016: 148). In sum, the slow/fast-motion and the freeze-frame function 
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phenomenologically inasmuch as such techniques shape the spectator’s temporal experience, but 
they can also function ontologically inasmuch as they depict the temporal singularities of the 
fictional world, and even psychologically inasmuch as they represent a peculiar temporal experience 
of some character.  
 
5. Conclusions  
La Sortie de l’Usine Lumière à Lyon (A. and L. Lumière, 1895), traditionally considered the first 
film in the history of cinema, is a real-time film. That is, an event lasting forty-six seconds is 
depicted as lasting forty-six seconds by a film lasting forty-six seconds. However, the real-time 
principle not only lies at the origin of the history of cinema but also constitutes a core principle of 
the moving image as a medium. The spectator normally experiences the events depicted in a shot or 
in a scene as having the same duration as the shot itself or as the scene itself. The Claim of 
Presentness adds that the spectator experiences these events as present, as going on right now. This 
claim is highly debatable, and yet a weaker and maybe more acceptable version of it can be 
formulated by means of what I have called the Wallon-Vuillaume hypothesis. The idea is that the 
spectator’s experience of the depicted events as present occurs in a peculiar temporal series, namely 
the pictorial series. First of all, the spectator does not treat the pictorial series as coinciding with the 
temporal series she experiences through the proprioceptive feedback of her body, unless she is 
watching such moving images as those of live television. Furthermore, the pictorial series makes 
room for temporal experiences that are not possible in ordinary temporal experience, namely 
flashbacks, ellipses, flashfowards, fast-motion, slow-motion, and freeze-frames. Such special 
experiences violate the real-time principle, thereby allowing the spectator to experience an event 
through a continuous experience that lasts less or more time than that event. While ordinary 
perceptual experience is forced to obey the real-time principle, the pictorial series normally abides 
by it but can sometimes violate it.  
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On the one hand, when the pictorial series abides by the real-time principle, film experience 
emulates ordinary perception. Such an emulation allows films to elicit intense emotions of fear, 
hope, suspense, disappointment, surprise, exultation, which seem to require a sense of presentness 
inasmuch as they depend on the imminent resolution of a certain uncertainty in what we are 
perceptually experiencing. As Yaffe puts it, “The point is that in whatever sense sensory 
experiences represent A-series properties, films do also, and this is a large part of the reason that 
films have the particular emotional effects that they have” (2003: 128). On the other hand, when the 
pictorial series violates the real-time principle, the film experience overcomes ordinary perception 
thereby turning the spectator into a sort of time explorer, who can do in time what we normally can 
do only in space, namely slowing down, stopping, pausing, speeding through, or jumping. Both the 
emulation of ordinary temporal experience and its overcoming, when skillfully exploited by 
filmmakers, can elicit valuable aesthetic experiences from spectators. As a matter of fact, some 
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i  3D films can reduce such a detachment but cannot completely suppress it, since the events 
depicted are relegated into a parallelepiped which intersects the spectator’s egocentric space but 
remains distinct from it. Instead, in the case of virtual reality, the space depicted wholly replaces the 
spectator’s egocentric space 
ii  One might wonder whether a screen on wall providing a depiction of just what was going 
on behind the wall would counts as both live and ‘here’ TV (I owe this suggestion to Ian Phillips; 
Currie (1995: 64) considers a similar case involving a window instead of a wall). I think that there 
remains an asymmetry between time and space in this respect since live television is live at the type 
level (all the broadcast tokens of that moving image are live) whereas Phillips’s wall or Currie’s 
window are ‘here’ only at the token level (only one special token of that moving image has the 
privilege of being ‘here’).  
iii  If one conceives of depiction in terms of sharing of features between the 
representation and the represented, then, strictly speaking, a slow motion shot depicts things slowed 
just as a wide-lens shot depicts things as warped and a black and white shot depicts things as black 
and white (cf. Phillips 2009, §3.4). Yet, a slow motion shot, as a representation, does not prescribe 




speed (likewise, a wide-lens shot prescribes a warped experience of things having their normal 
shape, and a black and white shot prescribes a black and white experience of things having their 
normal shape). That is to say that, in such cases, what matters is not depiction strictly understood 
but the way in which depiction is exploited in order to prescribe a certain experience. I believe that 
this holds also in the case of the backwards shots that we can find in films such as Je T’Aime, Je 
T’Aime (A. Resnais, 1968) or The Rules of Attraction (R. Avary, 2002). 
iv Thanks to Alaina Schempp, Filippo Contesi, Anna Giustina, Luca Bandirali, and Ian 
Phillips for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.  
 
